An unanticipated permanent increase in wage pressure is analysed in a dynamic general equilibrium model combining standard theory of capital accumulation and monopolistic wage setting. The long run (steady state) implications are identical percentage reduction in employment, consumption, and capital stock whereas wages and the real interest rate are unchanged. The reduction in employment on impact is larger than the steady state reduction whereas wages rise and the real interest rate declines on impact.
Introduction
Changes in wage pressure are normally analysed in static general equilibrium frameworks that exclude capital accumulation (e.g., Layard The results confirm the above assertion concerning wages but not concerning employment: higher wage pressure increases wages on impact and afterwards wages converge back to the same steady state level but the impact reduction on employment is larger than the steady state reduction.
Thus, employment overshoots the new permanent level. To understand this, it is necessary to look at the macroeconomic implications.
There are many ways of modelling the interaction between unions and investment in capital equipment even in partial static models. The pioneering 1 Layard et.al. (1991) does in fact make such interpretation on p. 107.
paper on the topic (Grout 1984) shows that unions decrease firm investments because of the 'hold-up' problem; i.e., the incentive to make an irreversible investment is low in a firm with organized workers because the firm knows that the union increases the wage claim after the investment is made. 2 wages over time such that employment is increasing over time. 2 The under-investment result in Grout (1984) is unambiguous because firm and workers bargain over both employment and wages after the investment is made. Hoel (1990) shows that there may be over-investment if the firms has the 'right-to-manage' employment and there is only bargaining over the wage. Anderson & Devereux (1988) obtains similar results in a non-cooperative setting. Devereux & Lockwood (1991) shows that Grout's negative effect on capital may be reversed in an OLG-model through a positive impact on household savings. However, in a similar setting de la Croix & Licandro (1995) shows that union power in general is less favorable to physical capital in the presence of irreversibilities. This paper is not the first one to introduce monopolistic wage setting in a Ramsey model. In fact, the framework is almost a continous-time version of Bénassy (1996) . The main difference is that Bénassy (1996) treats capital as an intermediate good by assuming that capital depreciates fully in one period. This is done to get analytical solutions outside steady state but it also implies that there is no transitional dynamics following an unanticipated permanent increase in wage pressure: the economy jumps instantly to a new steady state where employment is lower and the wage level is unchanged.
Thus, when analysing changes in wage pressure full depreciation is not only an unrealistic assumption it also yields qualitatively different results. Each intermediate good is produced using capital and sector specific labour.
All markets are perfectly competitive except the labour markets where each type of labour is controlled by one household/union. The household uses this power to set a wage per unit of labour that is above the opportunity costs of employment. Employment enters directly into the utility function due to increasing disutility from work and into the budget constraint due to increased wealth from working. All agents have perfect foresight.
The Representative Household
Each household i consists ofL i members. The household maximizes discounted lifetime utility defined as (time subscripts are omitted to ease nota-tion)
where C i is household consumption, L i is the number of employed household members which depends on the wage claim of the household, ρ is the rate of time preference, and γ is a parameter that determines the change in marginal disutility from increased work. Because of analytical tractability the analysis is confined to this utility function which is a special case of a more general class of utility functions that have reasonable properties (cf. Barro & Sala-iMartin 1995 ch. 9).
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The flow budget constraint iṡ
where A i is holdings of capital by the household, R is the rate of return on capital, W i is the wage claim of the household, κW is unemployment benefits which are linked to the overall wage level, and τ is a lump-sum tax that finances unemployment benefits. All households have the same initial holding of capital. In what follows, it is assumed that the upper limit on household employment,L i , is non binding and that each household has negligible influence on the overall wage level. Maximization of (1) subject to (2), a labour demand relationship L i (W i ), a non-negative consumption condition, a non-negative employment condition, and a no-Ponzi game condition yields the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule for consumptioṅ
and the wage equation
where
is the (numerical) wage elasticity of labour demand. The last equation states that the wage is set as a mark-up on the (marginal) opportunity costs of employment equal to the forgone utility of leisure measured in money terms and the forgone unemployment benefits. Equation (4) may be interpreted as standard wage-curve changing over time because of capital accumulation. To derive η i , it is necessary to look at the behaviour of firms.
The Final Good Sector
Final goods, Y , are produced using m intermediate goods according to the constant elasticity production function
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Cost minimization implies that the demand for intermediate good i equals
where C +Ȧ equals the aggregate demand for final goods and where
is the marginal (and average) costs of producing Y . The last equality in (6) follows from the assumption of perfectly competitive output markets.
The Intermediate Good Sectors
Each intermediate good sector i is characterized by many identical firms each optimizing an intertemporal profit function. The production of good i is given by Cobb-Douglas technology
where K i and L i are input of capital and labour, respectively. Z represents the current state of knowledge which grows at the exogenous rate g. There is no adjustment costs associated with changing inputs, and so firms use inputs according to the marginal conditions
where the final good price, P i , and the nominal wage, W i , are sector specific while the rental rate on capital goods, R, is identical in all sectors. The labour demand in sector i is obtained from (5), (7), (8), and (9)
which states that labour demand is decreasing in the wage and increasing in aggregate demand for final goods (consumption and investment) treated as exogenous by each household and firm, both of which are assumed too small to influence the overall economy. Since the capital stock in sector i is endogenous, the labour demand also depends on the rental price R; an increase in R reduces the capital stock which reduce the marginal product of labour. The assumption of perfect capital mobility across sectors influences the wage responsiveness of labour demand; the households must take into consideration that a wage rise reduces employment, which reduces the marginal product of capital and thereby the amount of capital, which decreases employment further. Equation (10) yields 
General Equilibrium and the Dynamic System
Symmetric households and firms implies that sector related variables (with subscript i) are identical across sectors, e.g., P i = P (= 1). We are interested in the development of aggregate employment, consumption, and capital stock equal to L = mL i , C = mC i , and K = mK i , respectively. In order to express the dynamics in a two dimensional system, it is useful to define k ≡
is derived as a function of k and c using (4), (8), and (11):
Equations (3), (5), (7), (9), and (12) yield (see Appendix)
c ≡ċ c
The path of the economy is characterized by (13), (14), and a conventional transversality condition. Figure 1 illustrates the phase-diagram corresponding to (13) and (14). The economy follows the saddle path towards the unique non-trivial steady state (k * , c * ); point C in Figure 1 . At the balanced growth path, the growth rates of aggregate consumption,Ĉ, and capital,K, equal the growth rate of knowledge, g, whereas aggregate employment is constant (cf. (12)).
< Figure 1 > Both (13) and (14) are independent of the two unions related parameters ε and κ. Thus, the dynamics of k and c are identical for two economies having identical initial value of k but different values of ε and κ. Note though, that k depends both on the state variables K and Z and the control variable L which implies that k jumps if L do so (in response to some unanticipated change). Hence, to use the phase diagram, it is important to recognize that the state variableK ≡ K/Z is below its steady state value,K * , whenever k is below its steady state value, k * , and vice versa. 4 
The Impact of Monopolistic Wage Setting
This section studies the implications of monopolistic wage setting in two ways. First, we compare the wage-setting economy and the corresponding competitive economy with identical capital intensities. In the competitive economy households take wages as given and unemployment benefits do not exist. 5 Second, we analyse the consequences of changes in wage pressure caused by changes in the (indirect) degree of competition among wage setters, ε, or in the replacement ratio, κ.
Let u denote the steady state unemployment rate defined as the relative difference in employment between the wage-setting economy and the corresponding competitive economy in steady state. 6 Then (11) and (12) yield
As usual the unemployment rate is an increasing function of the replacement ratio, κ, and a decreasing function of the degree of competition among wage setters, ε. It follows from the identical growth rates that this also holds outside steady state. (iii) follows directly from (8) and (9).
In general, it is not likely that a wage-setting economy has the same capital-labour ratio as a corresponding competitive economy since parameter changes that influence the rate of unemployment (i.e., ε, κ, ν, γ) have different effects on the capital-labour ratio in the two types of economies.
Proposition 1 does though describe the long run consequences of monopolistic wage setting as both economies converge to the same long run (steady state) capital intensity. This is clear from the phase diagram in Figure 1 which applies both to the wage-setting economy and the competitive econ- Proof. See Appendix.
Both a reduction in the degree of competition among wage setters, ε, and a rise in the replacement ratio, κ, increase the wage claims of the households and reduce employment. 8 This causes an immediate rise in the capital-labour ratio (as capital cannot jump). Two examples of that is illustrated in Figure   1 : if the economy is in the steady state initially then it may move from C to D whereas the movement from A to B illustrates a case where the economy is below its steady initially. It is clear from Figure 1 that c always increases.
This is due to the reduction in employment as aggregate consumption C declines as explained below. The increase in the capital-labour ratio raises the overall wage level and reduces the return on capital.
The wage rise of one household increases the aggregate real income of the household members but has negative externalities on the real income of other households as in static models. 9 In total the negative externalities dominate and therefore all households expect lower real income in the future. However, such a consumption path conflicts with the households desire for a smooth consumption path. Instead, households reduce consumption at all points in time after the parameter change and run down the capital stock smoothly. 10 
Concluding Remarks
In static general equilibrium analysis of changes in wage pressure, it is common to illustrate the macroeconomic outcome in a wage-price-setting diagram similar to Figure 2 (e.g., Layard, Nickell & Jackman 1991 ch. 1 and 8 or Booth 1995 ch. 8). 11 The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of an upward-sloping wage-setting curve (W S) and a downward sloping or horizontal price-setting curve (P S) in a wage-employment diagram. The W S curve describes the aggregate wage-setting behaviour of unions and is a mark-up on the labour supply whereas the P S curve describes the aggregate labour demand of firms. The slope of the P S curve is determined by the production function which only contains labour input; the horizontal P S curve arises when the production function is linear in labour whereas the downward sloping P C curve occurs when there is decreasing returns to labour. 12 An increase in wage pressure, say because of less elastic labour demands or higher replacement ratios, moves the wage setting curve upwards (W S 1 to W S 2 ).
Depending on the production function the consequences are then either (a)
an increase in wages and a relatively moderate reduction in employment (A to B) or (b) unchanged wages and a large reduction in employment (A to C). but share some elements of both.
The analysis is confined to a closed economy. In a small open economy with free capital movements and no capital adjustment costs the economy would jump instantly from A to D in Figure 2 ; the wage at the macro level would then be determined uniquely by the exogenous international real interest rate.
The model uses specific functional forms but does have reasonable properties; e.g., the economy converges towards a balanced growth path where the employment and the labour share of income are untrended. In a more general setting many things are possible. For instance, multiple equilibria and sunspots may arise if mark-ups are not constant (see Gali 1994) . 12 It is presumed that all agents have correct expectations. It is also possible to have a downward sloping PS curve with constant returns if the expectations of the agents are not fulfilled (see Layard et.al. 1991) . 13 In both cases, the equilibrium is Pareto inoptimal due to a 'coordination failure' among the unions. E.g., because each union does not take into consideration that a larger wage claim increases the price level which reduces the real wages of the other unions.
Appendix

Dynamic equations fork andĉ
Equations (7) and (5) and the assumption of clearing in the capital market
and (3) and (9) giveĊ
The growth rate of employment is derived by differentiating (12) and insert-
Inserting this into (17) and (18) gives (13) and (14).
Proving Proposition 2
Let a "hat" over a variable denote the growth rate of the variable. Before proving the proposition, we need to establish 4 lemmas:
Proof. From (17) and (18), we get
The term ν 2 αk −νk is positive when k < k * . The above equation implies thaṫ χ continues to increase ifχ > 0 contradicting the fact that the economy will ever approach a steady state. Thus,χ < 0 if k < k * or as k is increasing
Proof. From (16), we haveK = αK
The first term is negative whereas the second term is positive. Lemma 1
Using this inequality to substitute the term outside the first bracket yields
Lemma 1 implies thatχ = χ − ναk −ν − ρ < 0 when k < k * . Lemma 1 and
Applying the same method for the case k > k * gives a corresponding inequality that has to be fulfilled: Lemma 1 implies thatχ = χ − ναk −ν − ρ > 0 > −γαk −ν when k > k * .
Lemma 3 IfĈ
Proof. Equation (3) and (9) Proof. LetK ≡ K/Z and denote byK * 1 the steady state value ofK before the parameter change andK * 2 the steady state value after the parameter change. Note, that the growth rates ofK and k are independent of ε and κ for a given value of k. Thus, a change in ε or κ that increases (decreases) k on impact also increases (decreases) future values of k and according to Lemma 2 this decreases (increases) present and future growth rates ofK.
From Proposition 1 it follows thatK * 2 <K * 1 after a reduction in ε or rise in κ. This is only possible if the growth rates ofK decrease asK cannot change on impact. Thus, present and future values of k have to increase after a reduction in ε or rise in κ. 
